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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 12-2568 
_____________ 
 
LING HUANG, 
                                       Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                       Respondent 
______________ 
 
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW OF AN ORDER OF  
THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS 
(Agency No. A078-692-256) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Eugene Pugliese                     
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 21, 2013 
____________ 
 
Before: FUENTES, CHAGARES and BARRY, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: May 2, 2013) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
 
BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
 Petitioner, Ling Huang, a native and citizen of China, petitions for review of an 
order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge‟s 
(“IJ”) denial of her application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under 
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the Convention Against Torture Act (“CAT”).  For the following reasons, we will deny 
the petition.   
I. 
 Ling entered the United States on February 5, 2001 as a visitor for pleasure.  She 
was authorized to remain in the country until August 4, 2001, but failed to leave as 
required.  The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) served Huang with a Notice to 
Appear on November 27, 2007, which alleged that she was removable as a non-
immigrant who remained in the United States for a time longer than permitted, in 
violation of section 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. 
§1227(a)(1)(B).   
Huang filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection 
under the CAT on December 3, 2007, claiming that she would be persecuted in China 
because she gave birth to two children in the United States and would be subject to forced 
sterilization.  The IJ denied her application on April 16, 2008, finding that she had failed 
to establish the existence of a national policy in China of requiring forced sterilization of 
a parent who returns with a second child born outside of China.  Huang appealed the 
decision to the BIA, submitting additional documentary evidence in support of her family 
planning policy claim.  On August 26, 2009, the BIA remanded Huang‟s case to the IJ to 
consider evidence in support of her claim that the IJ failed to explicitly address, and to 
consider the new evidence submitted by her. 
At the September 14, 2010 hearing before a new IJ, Huang reiterated her fears of 
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China‟s family planning policy.  She also testified that she was afraid to return to China 
in light of her recent conversion to Christianity, which she had preached to her friends 
and family in China.  The IJ issued an oral decision denying Huang‟s application, 
incorporating the findings of the previous decision, and declining to accord significant 
weight to Huang‟s additional documentation in support of her family planning claim 
because it was unverified, appeared to be from the internet, did not appear legitimate, and 
otherwise failed to address Huang‟s specific circumstances.  The IJ further found that 
Huang‟s testimony regarding her recent conversion to Christianity was not credible.  Not 
only did the IJ find the timing suspicious—Huang converted only after her case was 
remanded by the BIA—but the IJ also considered Huang‟s demeanor unconvincing, 
concluding that her voice, emotion, and facial expression failed to evince sincerely held 
religious beliefs.  The IJ also found Huang‟s story as to how she found Christianity 
nonsensical and unpersuasive.   
On May 3, 2012, the BIA dismissed Huang‟s appeal, finding that the IJ‟s adverse 
credibility determination was not clearly erroneous and that Huang failed to provide 
sufficiently reliable and specific evidence to establish her family planning policy claim.  
The BIA also agreed that Huang failed to provide sufficient corroborating evidence or 
testimony regarding the sincerity of her recent conversion.  Accordingly, the BIA 
concluded that Huang failed to meet her burden for asylum, withholding of removal, or 
protection under the CAT.   
 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).  Where, as here, the BIA 
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adopts the findings of the IJ but also engages in a discussion of various issues, we review 
the decisions of both the IJ and the BIA.  Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 631 
(3d Cir. 2006). 
II. 
An alien may qualify for political asylum if he or she can demonstrate an 
unwillingness or inability to return to his or her homeland “because of persecution or a 
well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in 
a particular social group, or political opinion.”  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).  Withholding 
of removal may be granted upon a showing that it is more likely than not that the 
applicant will be subjected to persecution if he or she is deported.  Toure v. Att’y Gen., 
443 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2006).  To qualify for relief under the CAT, the applicant 
must establish “that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed 
to the proposed country of removal.”  Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174-75 (3d Cir. 
2002) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)).   Each ground for relief requires, at a minimum, 
credible testimony.  Gao v. Ashcroft, 299 F.3d 266, 272 (3d Cir. 2002). 
We review for substantial evidence, which requires us to examine the IJ's and the 
BIA's findings, including those of adverse credibility, to determine whether they are 
“supported by evidence that a reasonable mind would find adequate.”  Dia v. Ashcroft, 
353 F.3d 228, 247-49 (3d Cir. 2003) (en banc).  We may reverse a finding only when “no 
reasonable fact finder could make that finding on the administrative record.”  Id. at 249.  
Huang argues that the findings of the IJ and the BIA are not supported by substantial 
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evidence.  We disagree. 
 First, the BIA‟s decision to affirm the IJ‟s adverse credibility determination 
regarding Huang‟s newfound Christianity was supported by substantial evidence.  “The 
internal consistency of a witness's testimony, its consistency with other testimony, its 
inherent (im)probability, as well as the witness's tone and demeanor are important factors 
in determining credibility.”  Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 212, 220 (3d Cir. 2005).  Huang 
testified that she became a Christian in February 2010, only after her case had been 
remanded by the BIA, exceedingly late in her removal proceedings.  While perhaps not 
dispositive, the IJ‟s skepticism as to the timing was confirmed by Huang‟s confusing and 
nonspecific testimony regarding the conversion itself.  Huang testified that her 
conversion began because of the death-bed conversion of her employer.  After being 
asked several times to explain specifically how her employer‟s death affected her 
religious beliefs and giving unresponsive answers, Huang finally stated that he appeared 
happier after he had accepted his death.  Other than this vague and unverified testimony 
regarding the death of her employer, Huang was unable to give any rationale for her well-
timed conversion and subsequent proselytizing to family and friends in China.   
In addition, the IJ and BIA appropriately considered Huang‟s demeanor when 
testifying about her religious beliefs, which is “often a critical factor in determining [a 
witness‟s] veracity.”  Dia, 353 F.3d at 252 n.23 (internal quotations omitted).   Because 
an IJ is “uniquely qualified to decide whether an alien‟s testimony has about it the ring of 
truth,” Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 597 (3d Cir. 2003), we must accord the 
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IJ‟s personal observations of Huang‟s demeanor “an even greater degree of deference.”  
Dia, 353 F.3d at 252 n.23.  While credibility determinations must be made independent 
of whether the applicant has provided evidence to corroborate his or her claim, Abdulai v. 
Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir. 2001), in cases such as this where the IJ has valid 
reasons to question the truth of the applicant's testimony, the IJ may reasonably require 
the applicant to corroborate his or her testimony.  Huang failed to do so.  The IJ‟s and 
BIA‟s decision regarding Huang‟s fear of religious persecution was therefore supported 
by substantial evidence.       
Huang also contends that the IJ and the BIA erred in determining that she did not 
have a well-founded fear of persecution based upon the birth of her two U.S.-born 
children and failed to give sufficient weight to particularized evidence regarding the 
family planning policy in her hometown.  We have previously addressed the issues raised 
by Huang, most recently in Chen v. Attorney General, 676 F.3d 112 (3d Cir. 2011).  As 
here, petitioners in Chen were natives and citizens of China from the Fujian Province 
who had two United States citizen children and claimed that the female petitioner had a 
well-founded fear of forcible sterilization.  Citing the BIA‟s “comprehensive discussion” 
of a similar claim in In re H-L-H & Z-Y-Z, 25 I. & N. Dec. 20 (BIA 2010), we 
acknowledged that “State Department reports on country conditions, including the 
Profiles of Asylum Claims & Country Conditions, are „highly probative evidence and are 
usually the best source of information on conditions in foreign nations.‟”  Chen, 676 F.3d 
at 113 (quoting In re H-L-H & Z-Y-Z, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 213).  Considering the same 
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2007 State Department report on country conditions in the instant record, the BIA 
concluded that “physical coercion to achieve compliance with family planning goals is 
uncommon and unsanctioned by China's national laws and that the overall policy is much 
more heavily reliant on incentives and economic penalties.”  Id. at 115 (quoting In re H-
L-H & Z-Y-Z, 25 I. & N. Dec at 218).  We find that the BIA, and the IJ before it, did not 
err in concluding that Huang, who presented much of the same documentary evidence as 
at issue in Chen and In re H-L-H & Z-Y-Z, does not have a well-founded fear of future 
persecution based on her fear of forcible sterilization, and correctly concluded that the 
denial of Huang‟s application was supported by substantial evidence. 
Huang argues that the IJ and BIA failed to give sufficient weight to additional, 
particularized evidence Huang submitted in support of her application, including letters 
and certificates from family members describing their own sterilizations, testimonials 
from other parents of foreign-born children, and statements from her local Village 
Council.  Aside from being prepared for the purpose of the instant proceedings by 
interested witnesses, the letters from family members describing their own forced 
sterilizations fail to address the particular concern articulated here: a woman with United 
States citizen children returning to China.  The Village Council documents and an 
internet document titled the “Fujian Province Population and Family Planning 
Committee‟s answers to the inquiry made by a Chinese citizen who gave birth to children 
overseas,” are unauthenticated documents that provide no information from which the IJ 
or the BIA could assess their validity.  See Chen, 676 F.3d at 117 (finding that BIA and IJ 
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“properly discounted” similar unauthenticated document provided by petitioners‟ 
“Village Committee”).  Because the evidence submitted by Huang was either 
unauthenticated, or failed to address Huang‟s specific situation, the BIA and IJ did not err 
in according it little weight.  Accordingly, we find that no reasonable factfinder would be 
compelled to reach a conclusion different than that reached by the BIA.   
 Having failed to establish her eligibility for asylum, the BIA also correctly found 
that Huang did not satisfy the higher burden required for withholding of removal.  Chen 
v. Ashcroft, 376 F.3d 215, 223 (3d Cir. 2004).  Further, having failed to demonstrate that 
it is more likely than not that she would be subject to future religious prosecution or 
forcibly sterilized if removed to China, Huang is not entitled to relief under the CAT.  
Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 174-75.    
III. 
 We will deny the petition for review.   
 
